Politics after Violence

Legacies of the Shining Path Conflict in Peru

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course of reading drafts of these chapters and engaging in conversation with their authors.

Our first and most important thanks goes to the David Rockefeller Center for creating a vibrant intellectual community around Latin American politics. We are also grateful to the center and to Merilee Grindle, its director at the time, for supporting a conference that gathered most of the chapter authors for an initial conversation about these issues. Paola Ibarra played an especially important role in providing logistical support for the conference, and Steve Levitsky, generous in so many ways, also supported our application for funding.

That initial conference provided us with the opportunity to begin developing our thinking about how to contextualize legacies of the violence Peru experienced in the "long eighties." We did this by bringing together esteemed Peruvianists and experts on other Latin American countries marked by legacies of conflict to discuss early drafts of many of the chapters, and by bringing the chapters in dialogue with one another. In addition to the authors of the chapters in this volume, we thank Jorge Domínguez, Angelica Durán-Martínez, Richard Snyder, and Jocelyn Viterna for joining us and contributing so much to our discussion. We were also very lucky to benefit from the presence and comments of David Scott Palmer. We were saddened to hear of his passing as the production process concluded. We also thank Amanda Milena Alvarez for her careful note-taking, which freed us to actively participate in the lively conversations over two intellectually stimulating days.

We are grateful to Kerry Webb for her interest in the project, and to her and Angelica Lopez-Torres for guiding it through the review process so smoothly. Two anonymous reviewers provided insight on each chapter and how to better tie them together to arrive at a holistic answer to the question with which we began: to what extent and in what ways are Peruvian politics post-conflict? We are grateful to them for their comments.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the support of our family members, who kept us motivated when we needed it and distracted us when we needed a break. Hillel would like to thank Annie Stilz, who has lived with this project for so many years, compensated only by promises of more meals in Lima, and Rachel, who arrived partway through the long process of revisions. Alberto thanks Maria Ines Vasquez, who provided, as usual, invaluable doses of love and intelligence all along the way, and Ricardo Vergara and Lula Paniagua, his parents, with whom he started to discuss these issues back in the eighties.

INTRODUCTION

Leaving the Path Behind

Hillel David Soifer and Alberto Vergara

This book explores how the Internal Armed Conflict (IAC) of the long decade of the 1980s has affected Peruvian politics thereafter.[1] Although myriad consequences of the conflict are frequently mentioned in debates on contemporary Peruvian politics, this book constitutes an initial attempt to provide a unified and systematic assessment of the extent and nature of its effects.

This is, of course, not the first study of the conflict: as time has passed, bringing both more information and the critical distance that analysis requires, our understanding of the Shining Path's violence and the Peruvian state's reaction has grown steadily. Early in the 1980s the most important research on the conflict was spurred by surprise about its outbreak and centered on the rural (and purportedly indigenous) character of the Shining Path insurrection (see McClintock 1984; Palmer 1986). The late 1980s saw scholarly debate about whether the movement was in essence modern or millenarian (Degregori 1991b). Early in the 1990s the duration of the conflict and the country's general crisis generated a body of work in which scholars contemplated the abyss (Palmer 1992; Poole and Rénique 1992); in the second half of the decade researchers strove to respond both to the unexpected and sudden end of the conflict and to its link to the emergence of the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori (Stern 1998c); and in the 2000s the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación del Perú, or CVR) elaborated a comprehensive report (CVR 2003a) while Peru was reestablishing democracy. Since then, a new body of work has reinterpreted the emergence and development of the IAC and has started to ask about its consequences (Wilson 2013; Burt 2007; La Serna 2012; Heilman 2010; Theidon 2012; del Pino 2017).

This volume adds to the previous body of scholarship by systematically exploring how the IAC has affected contemporary politics and institutions in Peru. As this introduction will make clear, our analysis diverges from diagnoses claiming that the IAC is the central factor shaping contemporary Peru, as well as from those that dismiss its impact. Instead, we argue that the IAC left important legacies, but that as time passes these coexist with, affect, and are affected by a variety of other variables and processes. Thus legacies from violence—and from other historical processes—inevitably mesh with new historical processes to shape contemporary politics. The past of brutal violence has not left Peruvians, but the country is not defined only by this past. Our main task in this book is therefore to disentangle the intricacies of legacies of violent conflict from other historical legacies, and from the autonomous political and institutional development of contemporary Peru. We believe we substantiate the claim that the IAC left important traces in the country, but that it also has had divergent and unequal consequences, ranging from a mild impact on some dimensions of contemporary politics to a fundamental influence on others. By disaggregating the concept of legacies and exploring in detail some distinct dimensions of recent politics, we show the extent, and also the limits, of the conflict's impact on contemporary Peru.

The following pages of this introduction lay out a theoretical framework that will allow our contributors to investigate the consequences of the IAC in contemporary Peruvian politics and institutions. We begin by describing basic elements of the conflict that Peru suffered in what we call the "long eighties." The second section of the introduction provides an overview of the legacies that the comparative politics literature has attributed to the Peruvian conflict and highlights some points of departure for our reexamination of these issues. Third, we lay out an original theoretical framework to assess the consequences of the conflict for contemporary Peruvian politics. We close by briefly introducing the book's chapters.

The "Long Eighties"

In 1978, after ten years of military dictatorship, Peruvians elected a Constituent Assembly that would guide the country into a new democratic era. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the long-standing leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), received the

largest number of votes, and after half a century of persecution he was elected president of the Constituent Assembly. Communist parties, allowed to participate, received a third of the vote and constituted a solid new political bloc. This assembly produced the 1979 constitution, which established universal franchise for the first time in Peru's history. Governed by this document, Peru held its first genuinely democratic general elections in 1980: for the first time in the nation's history, there were no proscribed political parties, and no adult citizen was legally denied the right to vote (see Sanborn 1991).

Yet even as a tide of democratization swept across Latin America in the next decade, the period came to be labeled as the "lost decade" because of the severe economic crisis that swept across the region. In Peru, however, the 1980s were a twofold loss, as economic disaster unfolded hand-in-hand with harsh political violence.

The Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (which we will call the Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso, or SL throughout the volume) launched what it termed its "popular war" against the Peruvian state in 1980. As chapter 1, by José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner, traces, this declaration of hostilities initially went unnoticed in the Peruvian public sphere. When news of its emergence spread early in the decade, political leaders and government agencies saw the insurrection as a bad joke. Thirteen years later, when the Shining Path was defeated and the conflict came to an end, the country had suffered, according to the government-sponsored Truth and Reconciliation Report of 2003, more than sixty thousand conflict-related deaths (CVR 2003a). The report described the conflict as the longest and broadest in national history, while showing that it inflicted higher costs both in human and economic terms than did the war against Chile in the nineteenth century. In 1993, the same year that the Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán asked for a halt to hostilities, Peru approved a new constitution pushed by the *fujimorista* majority that ended the short-lived democratic experiment embodied in the 1979 constitution. This period of democratic experiment, economic crisis, and insurgency from 1979 to 1993 is what we call the "long eighties."

The Shining Path was a Maoist faction initially situated within the highly fragmented Peruvian Left of the 1970s. Its aim, inspired by the ideology of Mao Zedong and Peruvian thinker José Carlos Mariátegui, was to trigger a bloody revolution that would tear apart the Peruvian state. The Shining Path was a peculiar insurgency from a Latin American perspective both in terms of the messianic cult of its leader,

Abimael Guzmán, also known as "Presidente Gonzalo," and in terms of its indiscriminate use of violence (Gorriti 1990; Degregori 1991b; La Serna 2012; Heilman 2010; Hinojosa 1998; Portocarrero 2012).

Between 1980 and 1982 violence began to escalate, especially in Ayacucho, where five provinces were placed under a state of emergency in October 1981.[2] In 1982 Shining Path actions increased in the central Andes, which resulted in the replacement of the ineffective police by the Peruvian armed forces. As a result of both of these shifts, the violence escalated at the end of 1982 and the insurrection achieved national scope. In 1983, the killing of eight journalists from important Lima media outlets in the highlands of Ayacucho brought national attention to the conflict for perhaps the first time, revealing the barbarous violence that had silently enveloped the central Andes. Between 1983 and 1986 several massacres took place in the southern and central highlands departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junín, and Apurímac.[3] To make things worse, the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), a Cuban-inspired urban group, launched its own armed uprising against the Peruvian state in 1984.[4]

The second half of the 1980s saw several important shifts in the conflict. The Alan García administration elected in 1985 tried to implement a new development-centered strategy against insurgents, but this approach quickly failed. In 1986 the state massacred hundreds of Shining Path members in several jails, and the MRTA opened a whole new front of violence in the Peruvian jungle. In 1988 a paramilitary group called Rodrigo Franco burst into the conflict, perpetrating a few selected killings. By the end of the 1980s, the economy hit bottom, which favored a brutal Shining Path offensive especially targeted at the capital city of Lima. Simultaneously, as chapter 4, by Hillel David Soifer and Everett A. Vieira III, details, the army's counterinsurgency strategy switched from broadly indiscriminate violence to more targeted attacks. After the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, Grupo Colina, a new paramilitary group, carried out several massacres and other acts of violence, and by 1991 around half of the Peruvian population was living under a state of emergency. The conflict took a sharp turn in 1992, when Guzmán was captured and the Shining Path's fortunes declined sharply. In 1993 all the main Shining Path leaders asked for a peace accord, though a marginal contingent formed a faction called Prosequir that continued the armed conflict in jungle areas. Heavily associated with drug-dealing, Prosequir's impact was marginal. With these events, the decade of the long eighties came to a close in 1993 and the legacies of the IAC started to be identifiable.

It was a long conflict with traumatic effects on the country. The CVR report, using statistical techniques designed to account for the underreporting of civilian victimization, estimates that approximately sixty-nine thousand people died. Unlike in every other case of internal conflict in Latin America or most such conflicts around the world, in Peru the deadliest actor was not state forces, but the Shining Path, to which the CVR report attributed responsibility for 54 percent of all deaths. Adding to the trauma, the violence was widespread across Peru. Only two of the country's twenty-five departments, Moquegua and Madre de Dios, had no reports in the CVR investigation of casualties related to the political violence. The CVR report found that the central Andean region was particularly affected by the violence, with Ayacucho alone containing 40 percent of the victims. Almost 40 percent of the casualties were suffered by the poorest quintile of the country's population, mainly in rural areas, and 75 percent of all deaths were among speakers of an indigenous language, compared to some 25 percent of the total population. Hence, the demographic and territorial disparities in violence revealed deep and historical divisions within Peru.

And yet all this destruction was only part of the Peruvian "lost decade." The devastation of the IAC was accompanied by economic mismanagement that contributed to an unprecedented general crisis. Between 1980 and 1989, Peru's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 4.8 percent as the productive capacity of the country plummeted (Llosa and Paniza 2015). The fiscal deficit reached 12 percent of GDP in 1989, and in the same year inflation rose by more than 3,000 percent. In 1990 inflation reached 7,500 percent, and the Peruvian GDP per capita fell to 1960 levels (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 2005). Between 1985 and 1990 the rate of formal employment shrank from 53 percent to a mere 5 percent of the employed population (Parodi 2008). In addition to economic collapse, a cholera epidemic ravaged the country in 1991, affecting at least 700,000 citizens (MINSA 2011). In a nutshell, the IAC and other social and economic factors not only brought on a political and economic crisis but left the country on the verge of a crisis of stateness (Corrales 2003).

A new phase in Peruvian history began in the mid-nineties with the 1993 constitution, which still rules the country today, as discussed in chapter 3, by Maxwell A. Cameron. This new institutional framework for Peruvian politics and society was followed in the new millennium by an exceptional cycle of economic growth that transformed much of the Peruvian society. This new phase has implied, in both ob-

jective and subjective terms, the onset of a post-conflict period. If we accept the objective quantitative threshold of one thousand casualties per year often used to define a civil war (see, for example, Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), then Peru's conflict ended in 1994. In more subjective terms, although a few remnants of the Shining Path have survived in the Peruvian jungle, for most Peruvians "the era of terrorism" is doubtless a matter of the past, though as Arturo Maldonado, Jennifer Merolla, and Elizabeth Zechmeister show in chapter 10, the fear of terrorism nonetheless remains highly salient.

Based on this discussion and our reading of the broader literature, we use the term "post-conflict" to refer to the aftermath of conflict within Peru that involved significant violence by multiple armed actors against both one another and the civilian population. Although we do not seek to pin down an exact moment when Peru became "post-conflict," we define this period as encompassing the years from the mid-1990s to the present. This volume thus seeks to explore legacies of the conflict of the long 1980s that have affected and continue to affect Peruvian politics.

Legacies in Comparative Perspective

The literature on contemporary Peruvian politics is divided between scholarship attributing a decisive effect to the conflict and giving it a central causal role in explaining outcomes of interest, and work that downplays its effects to focus instead on other features of the country's history or more contemporary causal factors. This volume seeks to assess this surprising disjunction by evaluating which features of post-conflict Peruvian politics have been decisively shaped by the IAC, which have been affected in less fundamental but still important ways, and which seem to be a product of other causal forces.

A significant body of scholarship on Latin American and Andean politics has argued that the Peruvian case diverges from its counterparts in several important ways. Very often the political violence of the eighties is said to be the crucial variable that explains these anomalies. Arguments along these lines have been especially common in research on the development of civil society. In these accounts, social organization in Peru is said to be distinctively fragmented and weak as a result, at least partially, of the IAC. During the first years of the new millennia, when indigenous movements successfully emerged in

Andean countries, Peru was an "anomaly" with no national indigenous movements (Yashar 2005, 240). Mallon (1998) largely attributed the absence of ethnic identification among Peru's popular sectors to class-based conceptions of politics that dominated the Peruvian Left and Shining Path. Even more directly, Yashar (2005) compares Peru to Bolivia and Ecuador, and argues that in contrast to these neighboring countries, violence disrupted indigenous social organizations and networks in Peru, making it hard to politicize and mobilize ethnic divisions. And contrary to other cases in the Andean countries, ethnic parties also failed to emerge in Peru, which Van Cott (2005) claims was a consequence of the IAC. In essence, scholars have argued that the whole chain of ethnic politics, from identity to party representation passing through social organization, was severely impacted by the conflict.

Scholars have also attributed the evolution of Peru's political parties in the last decades to the IAC. The weakness of the Peruvian Left over recent decades is especially striking in comparative perspective (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). The IAC is said to have played a prominent role in this weakness: "If the Shining Path exacerbated social fragmentation, it also contributed to the polarization of the IU" (Roberts 1998, 260). One mechanism driving this outcome was the sense of fear that arose in Left-aligned civil society leaders during the conflict, which had the effect of weakening social movements (Burt 2006). In the same vein, legacies of violence constituted a hurdle shared by the Peruvian and Colombian Left, two countries that did not join the so-called Left Turn (Cameron 2011, 394). On the opposite side of the contemporary political spectrum, the enduring presence of a *fujimorista* party has been attributed to the enormous popularity Alberto Fujimori gathered after his government defeated the Shining Path (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). Finally, the weakness of Peru's regional parties and regional elites has also been traced back to the IAC (Vergara 2015a).

In contrast, other studies of post-conflict Peru have not granted the same causal importance to the IAC.[5] Kenney (2004) provides an explanation of the breakdown of Peruvian democracy in 1992 that centers on the lack of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. After the 1992 self-coup (*autogolpe*) that Fujimori carried out, several researchers focused on the politics and policies of the new political era. Many accounts of the neoliberal turn in Peru attribute no significant effect to the IAC in exploring either the introduction

of neoliberal policies or their effects (Wise 1994; Arce 2005). Nor do scholars explaining the implementation of new poverty alleviation programs (Schady 2000) or of decentralization (McNulty 2011) attribute a causal role to the violence of the 1980s. More recent research on democracy and technocracy in Peru has also given only marginal room to the IAC (Dargent 2015; Vergara and Encinas 2016). Similarly, work by scholars like Arce (2014) and Meléndez (2012) attributes the recent expansion of local conflicts and protest in Peru to contemporary political and economic factors and sets aside the causal role of the IAC, as do recent accounts of Peruvian "democracy without parties" (Levitsky 2013; Zavaleta 2014).

Hence, as we see, the weight given to the IAC in scholarly explorations of contemporary Peruvian politics varies fundamentally, ranging from key explanatory piece to ignored process. By digging into the Peruvian case in detail, this book attempts to provide a systematic analysis of these issues. We seek not to challenge or confirm any particular findings cited in the preceding paragraphs, but rather to produce a synthetic account of the consequences of the IAC for contemporary Peruvian politics.

To do so, we unpack several dimensions of contemporary Peruvian politics, society, and institutions to evaluate the extent to which they have and have not been shaped by the IAC. This systematic evaluation requires a framework that takes history seriously. As we explain in the next section, we need a careful temporal framework to distinguish causal chains that originated in the long eighties from factors that emerged thereafter, and also to distinguish the conflict from the longer historical processes of a fragmented society, polarized politics, and weak institutions that long predate it, and that also shape contemporary Peru in fundamental ways.

Studying Post-Conflict Peru

In laying the groundwork for the chapters that follow, several thorny methodological challenges in the study of post-conflict politics must be confronted. First, we cannot simply draw from the existing scholarship on post-conflict settings, because it sheds only limited light on our case. Scholars of post-conflict politics have tended to explore issues like peace negotiations and the implementation of the resulting accords (Walter 2002; Fortna 2003; Barnett 2006), the effects of international intervention in bringing an end to conflict and securing peace (Paris 2004; Fortna 2008; Stanley 2013), the political integration of former combatants (Blattman 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), and the outcomes and impact of post-conflict reconstruction projects (Baranyi 2008; Call and Wyeth 2008). Yet none of these processes unfolded in Peru.

In the Latin American context, much has been written about how violence, defined broadly enough to include inequality and social exclusion, has marked societies. To take but one example, the collection edited by Koonings and Kruijt (1999) investigates the "long-term consequences of violence, repression, and arbitrariness" (p. 2). Tracing the roots of this violence to social inequality, especially in the rural realm, and to struggles over political incorporation and social inclusion, they see it as one of the crucial "recurrent features of the Latin American political landscape" (p. 2). In studying the "legacies of repressive dictatorships and civil wars" (p. 3) they seek to explore the origins and consequences of violence in contemporary Latin America.

Yet in focusing on the legacies of the Sendero conflict, our collection takes a distinct approach. To understand why we focus on a specific conflict rather than the broader phenomenon of violence, one need only note a striking irony of the Peruvian conflict: Sendero Luminoso's armed insurgency began on the very day that democracy returned to Peru in 1980, and the end of the conflict coincided not with democratization but with the consolidation of the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori. It is reasonable to situate a specific internal conflict as nothing more than part of a broader phenomenon of structural violence in a case like Guatemala, where armed opposition emerged due to the level of repression and political closure, and thus the civil war itself can be seen as a consequence of the nature of authoritarian rule (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Goodwin 2001). But for the Peruvian case, as chapter 1, by Rénique and Lerner, and chapter 2, by Livia Isabella Schubiger and David Sulmont, make clear, the internal conflict cannot be reduced to being only a reflection or a component of broader processes of repression and inequality. We do not deny that long structural patterns of exclusion might affect the conflict—and chapter 6, by Jelke Boesten, shows these in an especially vivid manner in exploring issues of gender violence in contemporary Peru. However, beyond these long-term continuities, the armed conflict generated its own set of independent causal impacts on politics. This book is based on the presumption that these effects are worthy of exploration in their own right.

Therefore, we deal with the political legacies of conflict rather than post-conflict peace and reconstruction processes (most of which did not unfold in the Peruvian case) or legacies of violence more generally. To do so, we develop a new approach to studying the impact of the conflict in Peru. We hope that our new approach might not only shed light on the political legacies of the IAC but also aid scholars of other post-conflict settings as well, should they seek to shift their attention from the issues now central to that literature to the political impact of the conflict itself. Since our focus is the set of legacies of the IAC that shape post-conflict politics, we need to begin by delineating the boundaries of what we mean by "political legacies."

In taking on this challenge, we seek to complement a rich body of recent work that has explored the aftermath of the conflict in ways that are distinct to the approach we seek to develop. Kimberly Theidon and others taking an anthropological approach have superbly analyzed relationships within and among local communities after the conflict (Theidon 2012; del Pino and Yezer 2013). Olga Gonzáles and Cynthia Milton, among others, have explored the traces the conflict has left on artistic and cultural expression (Gonzalez 2011; Milton 2014; Faverón 2006). Other academics have peered into the memories of main actors (Milton 2018; Asencios 2017).[6] Our book does not investigate the cultural dimensions of the conflict's aftermath or observe it from a micro level. Instead, we focus on the macropolitical and institutional consequences of the conflict.

In focusing on these consequences, we seek to respond to what Blattman and Miguel (2010, 43) describe as "perhaps the most pressing area for future empirical research" on post-conflict settings: the "social and institutional legacies" of conflict. Understanding those legacies is exactly the goal of this book. However, we do not believe it is possible to generate analytically precise causal claims if we do not disaggregate the results beyond broad concepts like institutions or "democracy" (see Kier and Krebs 2010). In seeking causal precision, we explore how the legacies of the conflict shaped political institutions, civil society, and political attitudes and participation. That is, we unpack the macropolitical consequences, allowing us to provide a nuanced analysis of post-conflict Peru disaggregated across distinct political, social, and institutional realms. But before turning to a description of these realms and introducing the chapters to follow, we need to define the concept of post-conflict legacies and identify a set of mechanisms by which the legacies of conflict can be produced.

Disaggregating the Legacies of Conflict

To explore the legacies of Peru's conflict, we distinguish three causal channels through which its effects are produced and reproduced, and by which it has impacted contemporary Peruvian politics: wartime mechanisms, post-conflict legacies, and the political struggle over legacies.

Wartime Mechanisms

By wartime mechanisms we refer to those factors that were produced by the conflict, emerged during the conflict period, and have persisted into the post-conflict era. These are what Wittenberg (n.d.) calls "continuation legacies" in his typology. The most prominent set of wartime mechanisms discussed by our authors relate to the violence itself: the chapters by Eduardo Dargent and Noelia Chávez (chapter 5), Maritza Paredes (chapter 7), Paula Muñoz (chapter 8), and Alberto Vergara and Daniel Encinas (chapter 9), among others, show that violence impacted the social and political organization of many sectors of Peruvian society in ways that endured after the conflict ended. While in most cases the effects tended to weaken societal and political actors, Paredes shows that indigenous organization in the Amazon region was strengthened in response to violence, and Vergara and Encinas show that violence led to the growth of a more powerful and more conservative Catholic Church as a central actor.

In chapter 3, Cameron explores how the broader sense of crisis engendered by the conflict created the opportunity for Fujimori not only to carry out his *autogolpe* but also to craft a constitution that solidified authoritarian and neoliberal control. Like Cameron, Soifer and Vieira show in chapter 4 that institutional changes made during the conflict—in this case, reforms of the security apparatus—persisted long after the conflict ended.

Post-Conflict Legacies

In contrast to wartime mechanisms, which refer to aspects of the political arena that were altered during the conflict, post-conflict legacies refer to those factors that emerge in the post-conflict era as the result of effects of the conflict era. We thus define post-conflict legacies as factors that emerge in the post-conflict period as the result of the con-

flict. Here, too, violence itself is an especially important mechanism. Maldonado, Merolla, and Zechmeister, for example, show in chapter 10 that worry about terrorism remains strikingly high in Peru by comparison to other Latin American countries, and that this fear is especially salient among the cohort of Peruvians who lived through the conflict. This fear not only persists over time but also has sizable and systematic effects on democratic attitudes. In a similar vein, Dargent and Chávez show in chapter 5 that the violence in public universities in the 1980s contributed to the weakening of student mobilization in the post-conflict period, and Muñoz shows in chapter 8 that the Left's inability to distance itself from Sendero's actions during the conflict led it to "become associated in political discourse with terrorism."

Another set of post-conflict legacies centers on civil society. Here, the effects are distinct in different sectors of society: while Vergara and Encinas show in chapter 9 that the weakening of those sectors of civil society that supported parties of the Right has empowered technocrats and therefore reinforced neoliberal continuity, Paredes shows in chapter 7 that the human rights groups and lawyer-activists that emerged during the conflict and were strengthened by international support after the conflict ended (and especially in the later years of the Fujimori regime) were important allies for indigenous actions in the post-conflict period.

A third set of legacies is highlighted in chapter 3 by Cameron, who seeks to explain neoliberal continuity. Cameron highlights the continuing resonance of neoliberal ideology that emerged during the conflict, and the ways it has been sustained by the kind of state built in the post-conflict era.

Struggle over Legacies

Whereas both wartime mechanisms and post-conflict legacies are products of features of the conflict period, a third category of ways in which post-conflict politics is shaped by the conflict results from the choices and struggles of political actors, who frame, shape, and manipulate features of the conflict and its legacies for their own purposes (Krebs 2009, 255). We separate the discussion of legacies that take this form in order to highlight the agency of political actors in shaping them, and to label these constructed legacies. The most commonly echoed type of constructed legacy our authors highlight is the stigmatization of the Left (Muñoz, chapter 8), human rights issues (Paulo

Drinot, chapter 11), and collective mobilization more generally (Dargent and Chávez, chapter 5) as associated with terrorism. On the other side, activists have also at times sought to exploit acts committed by the state, especially ones that occurred under the Fujimori administration. Another use of constructed legacies appears in intra-state and intra-elite power struggles; Soifer and Vieira show in chapter 4 that memories of the conflict were used by actors seeking to strengthen the intelligence and surveillance apparatus in the Fujimori era, and Cameron shows more broadly in chapter 3 that pro-neoliberal actors have sought to frame the conflict in a way that justifies the neoliberal model as a central component of the defense against a recurrence of the unrest of the 1980s.

Incorporating this type of legacy into our analysis allows us to trace both the direct and objective legacies of the conflict, and the impact of the more subjective or constructed struggles on the legacies of the conflict. The conflict left objective legacies, but the political struggle over the interpretation or construction of those legacies can be as important as the objective ones.

Disaggregating Consequences

In all, this volume aims to provide a nuanced account of the consequences of the IAC for politics in contemporary Peru. We do not presume or argue that the IAC is the most central factor shaping politics in contemporary Peru. Peru, to put it simply, is "post-too many things": contemporary Peru might be described as not just post-conflict, but also post-hyperinflation, post-party system collapse, and post-authoritarian. Instead of arguing that the post-conflict lens is the most useful frame for understanding Peruvian politics, we seek to evaluate the extent of its utility. The country is still shaped by the IAC of the long eighties, but as time goes on, it becomes harder to disentangle consequences of the IAC from all the other variables and processes that have also affected Peru in the two decades since the IAC was finished.[7] These include a booming economy (Ghezzi and Gallardo 2013), the emergence of a new middle class (World Bank 2013), the deterioration of political representation (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016), and the ever-increasing presence of informality (W. Mendoza 2017), among others.

However, we do believe that the IAC unleashed some legacies that

significantly shaped some areas of contemporary politics and institutions in Peru. In order to grasp them, we need to unpack the broad notion of "contemporary politics" into manageable realms and explore each in turn. The book divides contemporary politics into four realms in which we observe the consequences of the conflict: state institutions, civil society, political parties, and public opinion, each of which is divided into specific dimensions that are the subject of individual chapters. This analytical approach allows us to make precise claims about the causal link between the IAC and each of those dimensions. Our framework distinguishing three types of legacies and the authors' focus on case studies of the Peruvian experience rather than sustained and systematic comparisons with other Latin American countries allows us to construct a careful and detailed picture of the consequences of the IAC on contemporary Peru. The concluding chapter of this volume by Steven Levitsky synthesizes the earlier chapters' findings to establish the extent to which the country is and is not decisively shaped by the conflict.

The book's first section provides historical and theoretical background. Chapter 1 gives a detailed historical overview of the IAC in Peru, while chapter 2 places the Peruvian case in the context of the contemporary political science scholarship on internal conflicts. The next section deals with state institutions. Chapter 3 highlights how neoliberal ideology, enshrined in the 1993 constitution, both took hold in Peru in response to Sendero's perceived threat to individual freedom and was sustained by the discrediting of other ideologies in the course of the long decade of conflict. Chapter 4 explores how the conflict shaped the state's coercive capacity, emphasizing how reforms of the military and of policing and surveillance institutions, as well as the reach of the state over territory, were the product of all three of the types of mechanisms elaborated in this introduction. Chapter 5 investigates how the conflict deepened the crisis of Peru's public university system in several important ways.

The third section explores civil society and the impact of the IAC. Chapter 6 makes the case that both ineffectual state policies against gender violence and recent mass mobilization defending women's rights can be traced to the IAC. Chapter 7 focuses on indigenous mobilization in the political context of the contemporary boom in extractive development in Peru, which provides a new setting for the study of indigenous movements and the responses they draw from the state. Both chapters show that the IAC had a decisive impact on contemporary Peruvian civil society, and that its effects continue to be felt.

In the fourth section, on political parties, chapter 8 analyzes the link between the IAC and the leftist sectors of the political spectrum, while chapter 9 examines connections to the political right. In chapter 8, Muñoz contends that the end of political violence came with not only the military defeat of the Shining Path but also the political defeat of the legal Left. She argues that the prospects of the Left for effectively becoming an institutionalized and electorally appealing political party were undermined by the manner in which the conflict ended. Vergara and Encinas describe in chapter 9 the transformation of the Right from organic political parties in the 1980s to a new condition they label as a "conservative archipelago." Part of this transformation, they contend, was related to the IAC.

The fifth section contains two chapters dealing with Peruvian public opinion, though from very different perspectives. Chapter 10 provides a statistical and experimental analysis of the attitudes of Peruvian citizens toward terrorism and their implications for democratic support. In contrast, chapter 11 takes a qualitative approach in exploring the comments of YouTube users on videos related to memorials of the conflict in order to document the collective struggle to construct the memory of the IAC in the absence of a collective memory project in the country. The volume's conclusion places all of these in-depth chapters in a wider Latin American perspective, producing a synthetic evaluation of the ways in which contemporary Peruvian politics are decisively shaped by the IAC.

In all, our aim in compiling this volume is to deepen the process of analytical inquiry into the legacies of violence for contemporary Peru. Yet we seek to go beyond that: for most of the contributors of the book, the Shining Path's brutal actions, and the consequences they unleashed, were vivid, tragic, and major events. As Schubiger and Sulmont remind us in their chapter, the department of Ayacucho, where the conflict began and had the deadliest consequences, saw an absolute loss of population between the censuses of 1981 and 1993. The "long eighties" were, in other words, a national catastrophe. Regardless of where we stand politically or how we interpret such a history of violence, it is clear that the scars and legacies of the conflict continue to trouble its heirs in ways that cannot be ignored. Recognizing and analyzing these effects in a systematic manner is an indispensable step on the path to developing a national conversation about the conflict. Such a national dialogue, as Drinot's chapter shows, has not emerged in a rational or inclusive way. Instead, a systematic understanding of the conflict and its legacies seems to remain elusive and opaque for

most Peruvians. Expanding on Dargent and Chavez's insightful description of contemporary university students, what seems to prevail in the country is a "silent majority." Our aim, then, beyond our academic purposes, is to help the country to recognize some of the ways in which it is shaped today by the savage violence of the long eighties, and also some of the ways in which contemporary politics is rooted in other historical factors. A clear understanding of these complex processes linking past and present will always be a necessary requirement for finding one's way to a better future.

Notes

1. "Internal Armed Conflict" is the term used by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to characterize the violence between the Shining Path and other non-state armed groups and the Peruvian state. The notion of "long eighties" is explained below.

2. The following paragraphs rely on the CVR Final Report to constitute a brief historical reconstruction of the Peruvian Internal Armed Conflict. For a detailed account of how the conflict unfolded, see chapter 1 by José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner.

3. The army was responsible for, among others, the Sacos, Pucayacu, Accomarca, and Putis massacres; the Shining Path perpetrated, among others, the Lucanamarca and Huancasancos massacres.

4. Since the conflict between the MRTA and the state was less bloody than that pitting Sendero against the state, and since public perception of the violence Peru suffered focused more heavily on the latter, we describe the violence from 1979 to 1993 as the Sendero conflict throughout the volume.

5. To be fair, it is difficult to find research on contemporary Peru that fully dismisses the IAC, since most of this work does attribute some role to the general turmoil of the eighties. Yet in contrast to the work discussed in the previous paragraph, the scholarship we discuss here does not grant the IAC a central role in its analyses.

6. In addition to the academic literature on cultural legacies of the conflict, a nonacademic but vivid and fruitful body of work both on the IAC and its legacies has boomed in several genres in contemporary Peru. Scholars and intellectuals personally involved in the conflict have produced engaging and eclectic books that have resonated far beyond the academic realm (see, among others, A. Gálvez 2009; Gavilán 2012; Agüero 2015; Cisneros 2015). Fiction writers have peered into the period as well (see, among others, Roncagliolo 2006; Colchado 1997; Cueto 2005; Thays 2008; M. Vargas Llosa 1983; see also the notable graphic novel by Cossio, Rossell, and Villar 2008); and filmmakers have also successfully explored it (among others, see Lombardi 1988; E. Mendoza 2017; H. Gálvez 2015; del Solar 2015; C. Llosa 2009; Calero 2016).

7. On these methodological questions relating to temporality, see the analysis of the Mexican Revolution and its consequences in Knight 1985.

CHAPTER 1

Shining Path: The Last Peasant War in the Andes

José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner

The process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail.

BARRINGTON MOORE, *SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY*

In mid-1988 the hitherto mysterious leader of the Communist Party of Peru, better known as the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), broke his long silence. In his first interview since the beginning of the insurrection, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso boasted of the successful progress of a rebellion whose central protagonists, he claimed, were "the poor peasants" of Peru. In Guzmán's words, the poor played a primary role in the "People's Guerrilla Army," serving "as fighters and commanders." Led by this organization, the "people's war" spread through the highlands, "from one border to the other, from Ecuador to Bolivia," along a region that was "the historic axis of Peruvian society and its most backward and poor area" (Guzmán Reynoso 1988). Eight years earlier, the start of the Shining Path uprising had been received with disbelief. Even as it continued to grow, leftist leaders had insisted that it was "infantile." President Fernando Belaunde, during his second period in power (1980–1985), had labeled the insurgents "rustlers." As late as 1983, military officers had declared that eliminating the Shining Path would take only a few weeks (CVR 2003a, 2:60).

Was this, then, effectively a "peasant war"? If so, how was it possible in a country where one of the most radical agrarian reform efforts in contemporary Latin America had been recently enforced, and where more than 60 percent of the population had become urban? Why did other political and social actors seem to miss it? These questions lie at